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Human memory is reconstructive in its nature (Bartlett, 
1932/1995; Hunter, 1957). This means that memory 
gaps are filled with conclusions resulting from various 
memory strategies and constructive processes, leading 
to a meaningful unified recollection. The gaps may be 
filled with information matching the true fragments of the 
memory, stemming for example from suitable cognitive 
schemata (e.g. Markus, 1977; Wojciszke, 1986), stereotypes 
(e.g. Kunda & Spencer, 2003), prejudice (e.g. Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), attitudes 
(e.g. Hymes, 1986) or personal involvement in the issue 
(Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977).
One of the most striking examples of the reconstructive 
nature of memory is the misinformation effect, in which 
participants’ recollection of an event is less accurate 
when misinformation about its details is dispersed before 
questioning about the event (seminal experiments: Loftus, 
Miller & Burns, 1978). In a typical experiment, participants 
first view a film or a sequence of slides, then read a 
description of it which, in the experimental group, contains 
some incorrect details. Afterwards, they answer questions 
about the film or slides. Usually, the performance of the 
misled experimental group is poorer than that of the non-
misled control group. 
In this article we wanted to explore two factors as 
possible mediators of the misinformation effect: a warning 
against misinformation, and personal involvement in the 
issue towards which the misinformation is directed, as well 
as the combination of both. 
In the case of personal involvement, we were unable 
to locate any articles relating this factor to the mnestic 
misinformation effect. However, there exists much 
research on the relationships between general memory and 
involvement, which usually indicates that high personal 
involvement promotes better memory functioning (e.g. 
Bellezza, 1984; Greenwald, 1981; Wallen, 1942). For 
Rogers et al. (1977) the self functions as a superordinate 
schema, deeply involved in the processing, interpretation, 
and memory of personal information. Rogers et al. even 
suggest that self-reference provides a basis for even deeper 
processing than a semantic one.  
Apsler and Sears (1968), whose methodology was 
adapted in our research, argue that humans will involve 
themselves in an issue if they think it has consequences 
for their lives. In the context of eyewitness testimony, a 
“self-relation” may be defined as “…the extent to which 
the circumstances of an event, its reality, its resemblance 
to the experiences of the subject and the similarity to the 
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victim as regards e.g. age, gender or social status, make the 
event important to the subject and incline him/her to think 
that he/she might be a victim of a similar event” (Styśko, 
2004, p. 248). Generally, such involvement should promote 
memory.
Taking all this together, we hypothesized that the benefits 
of memory stemming from involvement would also be valid 
in the context of the misinformation effect, that is, involved 
subjects should be more resistant to misinformation than 
non-involved. This should be so, because high involvement 
results in better memory of the initial event, which in turn 
is positively correlated with better accuracy and greater 
resistance to misinformation. Such hypothesis is supported 
by the  results of many experiments showing that subjects 
are more accurate if the critical misled item is central and 
very visible, whereas peripheral items that are difficult 
to detect are vulnerable to misinformation (e.g. Dalton & 
Daneman, 2006; Loftus, 1979; Wright & Stroud, 1998). 
These results are usually interpreted as an argument for 
the thesis that information which is well remembered is 
difficult to mislead, whereas information poorly or not at 
all remembered is easy to mislead. Centrality vs. periphery 
is yet one factor that may influence the memory, another 
is involvement. Therefore, involvement should lessen 
vulnerability to misinformation and promote accuracy. 
As for warnings, most research done so far indicates 
that these usually reduce a  subjects’ vulnerability to 
misinformation (Blank, 1998; Echterhoff, Hirst & Hussy, 
2005; Greene, Flynn & Loftus, 1982), although some shows 
that warnings may be inefficient (e.g. Neuschatz, Payne, 
Lampinen & Toglia, 2001; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). The 
degree to which warnings are effective varies considerably 
and depends, for example, on the ability to monitor the 
source of information (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), or 
the discriminability of sources of information (Lindsay, 
1990). Also, noticing of discrepancies between the original 
information and the misinformation by participants increases 
the efficacy of warnings (Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; 
Polczyk, 2007). 
In the research presented in this article we wanted to 
check whether the efficacy of a warning depended on the 
subjects’ involvement in the issue. We hypothesized that 
in the case of highly involved misled participants, the 
efficacy of the warning would be less. This should be so, 
because high involvement results in low vulnerability to 
misinformation (according to the hypothesis stated above), 
and thus there is no effect against which the warning can 
protect. Floor effects simply occur. 
The third and most important hypothesis verified in 
the presented research concerns the efficacy of warning 
in the case of non-misled subjects, and is connected with 
a very interesting approach to researching the effects of 
warnings, suggested by Echterhoff, Groll and Hirst (2007). 
They warned their subjects about nonexistent discrepancies 
between the original event and the postevent information 
and checked whether such a warning negatively influences 
the memory performance concerning the original event. 
Echterhoff et al. assumed that warnings may result in 
a tendency to overcorrect responses, making them less 
accurate, even in the case of non-misled subjects.
An inspiration for this point of view was provided by 
Martin (1986) who showed that when people are aware that 
they are being subjected to an unwanted influence, they 
tend to “correct” for it by, for example, discounting the 
threatening information. Because the distinction between 
dangerous and safe information is usually not easily made, 
the subject may reject all the information provided to 
him/her. According to Echterhoff et al. (2007), a similar 
mechanism may arise as a consequence of warning 
subjects/witnesses against misinformation. “Eyewitnesses 
who attempt to avoid the intrusion of postevent information 
into their event memory may reject event items that were 
– correctly! – reported by the co-witness” (p. 369). In the 
misinformation paradigm, such “overcorrection” could 
occur when a subject’s attempts to correct for potential 
errors result in increased rejection of correct information 
presented either in the original event, or in the postevent 
information. This effect is called “the tainted truth 
effect” because – as the authors maintain – “this type of 
overcorrection diminishes memory reports for “true” event 
items” (p. 369). 
In our research, we wanted first of all to simply replicate 
the tainted truth effect, because we were not aware of 
any existing replications. More importantly, we wanted 
to check whether the tainted truth effect is moderated by 
involvement. Echterhoff et al. (2007) claim that the tainted 
truth effect is relevant mainly in the case of information 
that is difficult to remember.  According to this, it should 
be more pronounced in the group of lowly involved 
participants, because such participants tend to remember 
less from the original event. 
To sum up, the aim of this research was to verify six 
hypotheses: 
(1) The usual misinformation effect should be 
replicated; 
(2) High involvement in the original event results in 
lower susceptibility to misinformation; 
(3) Warnings improve the performance of misled 
participants; 
(4) Warnings deteriorate the performance of non-misled 
participants; 
(5) High involvement results in lower efficacy of warning 
for misled participants, compared to low involvement; 
(6) Deterioration of the memory of the original event 
caused by warnings against nonexistent discrepancies, is 
more pronounced when involvement is low.
To verify these hypotheses two experiments were 
conducted. In the first experiment, all the above-mentioned 
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hypotheses were verified. The second study checked 
whether participants did remember the original event; the 
rationale for such an analysis is given in the introduction to 
the second experiment.
Experiment I
Method
Participants
A sample of 349 participants took part in this study (234 
female, 112 male, gender unknown for 3 subjects); mean 
age was 16.28 (SD = 0,60). No gratification for participating 
in the experiment was given.
Materials
1. A “radio debate” produced for the experiment by four 
amateur and one professional radio presenter, duration 6 
minutes and 30 seconds. The script concerned an educational 
reform, seemingly planned for Polish universities. A similar 
topic was used by Apsler and Sears (1968); it was applied 
in other research as well (e.g. Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 
1981). The debate was moderated by a radio presenter, who 
was talking to four students about the planned reform. 
2. Written description of the debate – in the experimental 
group, it contained misinformation: six details differed 
from the recording, seven others were new. In the control 
group the text did not contain any changes or additions.
3. A short, five-item test – for measuring attitudes 
towards the planned reform, and consisting of the following 
questions: “Do you think the general final exam should be 
obligatory in all universities in Poland?”; “Do you agree 
with the idea of a general final exam?”; “Is such an exam 
useful?”; “If you were given a choice, would you take 
such an exam?”; “If you were the rector of a university, 
would you introduce such an exam?”. All questions were 
answered on a 9-point Likert-like scale. 
4. Memory test, consisting of 20 items – 13 items 
related to the misinformation, seven others were fillers. 
The participants had to rate each item on a two-point scale: 
“true” (i.e. consistent with the debate) or “not true”, and 
to indicate on a 7-point Likert-like scale their subjective 
confidence in their choices.
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in two high schools. 
The experimenter introduced herself as a scientist from 
Jagiellonian University, performing research for the 
National Council for Higher Education, concerning a 
planned reform of Polish universities. She explained that 
the reform consisted in the introduction of a general final 
exam covering all the courses taken during five years of 
the studies, as a necessary prerequisite for graduating. Half 
of the subjects were told that they would be affected by 
the reform, as it would start within two years. The second 
group learned that the proposal “had a planned target date 
of 2018”. In this way, groups of high and low involvement 
were created. Afterwards, the subjects listened to the 
recording about the reform. In order to make the procedure 
more plausible, the subjects were asked to give written 
opinions on the reform. After 15 minutes, all the subjects 
read a description of the recording; for half of the subjects 
it included 13 misleading details, relating accordingly to 
13 items in the final memory test.  Afterwards, half of the 
subjects were warned that the text could contain information 
inconsistent with the recording, and that they should only 
rely on the recording while answering questions about 
the reform. The warning was phrased as follows: “While 
answering the questions you should rely only on what 
you remember from the recording. The text you’ve just 
read contained a few details that were inconsistent with 
the recording. Therefore when answering the questions, 
use only the information from the recording”. The second 
group did not receive any warning. Immediately afterwards 
a memory test based on the recording was administered. 
Thus, the design was: 2 misinformation (present or absent) 
× 2 issue involvement (high or low) × 2 warning (present 
or absent). 
Results
An analysis of variance was performed to examine all 
possible main and interaction effects. The main effects of 
misinformation, involvement, and warning were statistically 
significant: misled subjects performed worse (F[1, 341] = 
66.46; p < .01; η2 = .16), thus confirming the first hypothesis. 
Involved subjects performed generally better than non-
involved ones (F[1, 341] = 5.07; p = .03; η
2 = .01); hence, 
the second hypothesis was also confirmed. Interestingly, 
involved subjects were better than non-involved ones 
regardless of the presence or absence of misinformation, 
as indicated by the non-significant interaction between 
the involvement and misinformation (F[1, 341] = 1.41; p = 
.24; η2 < .01). To further assess the role of involvement in 
the case of “neutral”, non-misled memory, we compared 
results on the critical items between highly involved non-
misled and lowly involved non-misled subjects. The former 
outperformed the latter (F[1, 341] = 14.08; p < .01; partial η
2 
= .04). Additionally, we checked whether high- and low-
involvement groups differed on filler questions, which can 
also be added up to form a memory index. In this analysis, 
involvement also improved memory (F[1, 347] = 6.35; p = .01; 
η2 < .02).
Warned subjects fared better than those not warned 
(F[1, 341] = 9.27; p < .01; η
2 = .03). More interestingly, the 
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interaction between the warning and the misinformation 
was significant (F[1, 341] = 43.23; p < .01; η
2 = .11); this is 
presented in Figure 1 above. 
As can be seen, in the case of misled subjects, warning 
significantly improved performance ((F[1, 341] = 43.41; p < .01; 
partial η2 = .11), thus confirming the third hypothesis stating 
that warning reduces vulnerability to the misinformation 
effect. In light of the planned comparisons, the difference 
between non-misled warned and non-warned subjects was 
significant (F[1, 341] = 6.67; p = .01 ; partial η
2 = .02): non-
misled warned subjects performed worse than non-warned 
non-misled subjects. Thus, the fourth hypothesis stating 
that warning results in worsening of “normal” memory 
performance was confirmed.
In the next analysis we explored the interaction among 
three factors: misinformation, warning, and involvement. 
This allows checking of whether the interaction between 
misinformation and warning, described above, is moderated 
by involvement. The three-way interaction was statistically 
significant (F[1, 341] = 36.09; p < .01; η
2 = .10), and is presented 
in Figure 2 above. 
As can be seen, the effects of warning are quite 
different in high- and low-involvement conditions. In the 
case of highly involved participants, the warning improved 
the performance of misled subjects (F[1, 341] = 51.96; p 
< .01; partial η2 = .13). However, in the case of the low 
involvement group, the warning was clearly less efficient – 
its effect was only marginally significant (F[1, 341] = 3.38; p 
= .07; partial η2 < .01). Thus, the results seem to contradict 
the fifth hypothesis, stating that warning is less effective in 
highly involved groups.
It is also clear that the effect of “tainted truth” shown 
in Figure 2 – that is, the harmful consequences of warning 
in the case of non-misled subjects – only occurred in the 
high-involvement group. In this group, warned non-misled 
subjects committed more errors than did non-warned 
non-misled subjects (F[1, 341] = 23.95; p < .01; partial η
2 = 
.07). However, in the case of low-involvement subjects 
the warning did not produce any statistically significant 
differences in the case of non-misled subjects (F[1, 341] = 1.63; 
p = .20; partial η2 < .01). Looking at the same data the other 
way we can see that in the case of the high involvement 
group, warned misled subjects were more accurate on 
critical items than warned non-misled subjects (F[1, 341] = 
6.69; p = .01; partial η2 = .02), which is the usual effect of 
a warning observed in most experiments. However, in the 
low-involvement group the effect of warning was reversed: 
misled subjects were less accurate than non-misled subjects 
(F[1, 341] = 21.56; p < .01; partial η
2 = .06). In other words, the 
warning “protected” subjects against misinformation in the 
high-involvement condition, not in the low-involvement 
one. Hence, the sixth hypothesis stating that deterioration 
of the memory of the original event caused by warning 
against nonexistent discrepancies is more pronounced 
when involvement is low, was not confirmed – in fact, the 
results show quite the opposite.
Another striking effect of this analysis is the significant 
difference between high and low involvement conditions in 
the groups of warned misled subjects: subjects in the low 
involvement group were more susceptible to misinformation 
than in the high involvement group (F[1, 341] = 20.65; p < .01; 
partial η2 < .06).
For exploratory reasons, we also checked the interaction 
between warning and involvement; it was insignificant (F[1, 
341] < 0.01; p = .98; η
2 < .01).
In summary, the results indicate that the harmful 
effects of warning against nonexistent discrepancies only 
occurred in the case of high involvement. Moreover, the 
warning reduced the misinformation effect only in the high 
involvement condition. 
Respondents’ subjective confidence in their memory 
accuracy was analysed in the same way as memory 
performance was. Warning reduced the subjective 
confidence of participants (F[1, 327] = 5.03; p = .03; η
2 = 
Figure 1. Mean accuracy on critical items as a function of interaction of 
misinformation and warning.
Figure 2. Mean accuracy on critical items as a function of interaction of 
misinformation, warning and involvement.
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.02). The remaining main effects: misinformation and 
involvement, were non-significant (F[1, 327] = 2.20; p = .14; 
η2 < .01 and F[1, 327] = 2.43; p = .12; η
2 = .01, respectively). 
Non-significant effects were also obtained for all possible 
interactions: misinformation and involvement: (F[1, 327] = 
2.42; p = .12; η2 < .01), misinformation and warning (F[1, 327] 
= 2.85; p = .09; η2 < .01), involvement and warning (F[1, 327] 
= 0.25; p = .62; η2 < .01) or misinformation, involvement 
and warning (F[1, 327] = 0.05; p = .82; η
2 < .01). 
Discussion
In Experiment I the usual misinformation effect was 
replicated (for a review, see for example, Ayers & Reder, 
1998; Wright & Loftus, 1998; Zaragoza, Belli & Payment, 
2006). This confirms how memory is vulnerable to 
inconsistent postevent information and should be a warning 
for forensic practitioners. In addition, susceptibility 
to misinformation was influenced by participants’ 
involvement: those who were involved in the issue, were 
more resistant to misinformation.  Thus, the first hypothesis 
was confirmed. The interpretation of this result is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that the predominance of involved 
subjects was significant both in the misled and non-misled 
groups. In other words, involved participants performed 
more correctly on the critical items regardless of the 
presence or absence of misinformation. Nevertheless, this 
result suggests that involvement may reduce susceptibility 
to misinformation. 
Assuming that high involvement indeed protects against 
misinformation, the question arises of, by what specific 
mechanisms does this take place? For example, it is possible 
that highly involved subjects might have been very interested 
in the issue presented in the original material, so they were 
concentrated on the recording and thus able to remember 
more details than lowly involved participants. This could 
have made highly involved subjects less vulnerable to 
misinformation. Lowly involved participants might have 
listened to the recording less carefully, so their memory 
of the original event was weaker. Such an interpretation 
is consistent with existing findings (e.g. Loftus, 1979) 
suggesting that the better the memory of the original event, 
the greater the resistance to relevant misinformation. It is 
also possible that lowly involved subjects, who followed 
the original event less carefully, filled their memory gaps 
with the misinformation from the postevent material. 
The warning against the discrepancies between the 
original and postevent material reduced vulnerability to 
misinformation in the misled group. More interestingly, 
and contrary to our hypothesis, this effect seemed only to 
occur in the case of persons misled and highly involved 
in the matter. In the case of lowly involved misled group, 
performance was poor regardless of the presence or absence 
of warning. This may indicate that the lowly involved 
participants did not care for the results, regardless of the 
warning. Another possible explanation for this effect may 
be connected with the amount of information remembered 
from the original event by lowly involved subjects. If 
one does not remember the original material, the warning 
against misinformation can not help much. In contrast, 
highly involved misled participants remembered the 
original event better and thus were able to take advantage 
of the warning, because it provided a good justification for 
perceived discrepancies between the original event and the 
postevent material.
The tainted truth effect, first described by Echterhoff et 
al. (2007) was replicated in our study: non-misled warned 
subjects performed worse than non-misled non-warned 
ones. This is the only replication of this effect of which we 
are aware. Thus, the hypothesis stating that warning may 
cause subjects to refrain from reporting correct information 
was confirmed. 
In our research we also explored the impact of personal 
involvement on the tainted truth effect. It turned out that 
contrary to the third hypothesis stating that the tainted truth 
effect is greater in the case of lowly involved subjects, the 
tainted truth effect was observed in the highly involved 
group only. In the case of the low involvement group, 
the warning did not deteriorate the results of non-misled 
subjects. Thus, it is possible that subjects who did not 
care for the issue presented in this experiment also did not 
care for the warning, and therefore no overcorrection took 
place. It is even possible that non-involved subjects did 
not remember the original event very well, nor did they 
remember its description. In this case overcorrecting was 
difficult because a necessary prerequisite for this action is 
remembering the correct postevent information. 
In contrast, the tainted truth effect was quite apparent 
in the highly involved group. It is possible that highly 
involved participants, being more interested in the issue, 
read the description of the original event very carefully, 
and were unable to detect any discrepancies between it and 
the original event (because there were not any). Following 
Grice’s (1975) suggestion that people normally assume the 
cooperative principle in human communication, we can 
suppose that subjects did not suspect that the experimenter 
was trying to “deceive” them, and they might have 
disavowed a lot of information from the postevent material. 
Hence, the level of performance in the memory test in this 
group became lower.
The only significant result concerning subjective 
confidence in the results was connected with the warning: 
it reduced confidence (regardless of other factors: 
misinformation and involvement).  This may be surprising 
because warning is, technically speaking, simply information 
that the postevent text may be inconsistent with the original 
event. Those of the subjects who noticed these discrepancies 
should not be less confident because the warning provides 
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an explanation for the inconsistencies. The results were 
quite opposite, which suggests that the majority of the 
subjects were not aware of the inconsistencies. In this case, 
warning confused the subjects, because they could not 
detect the discrepancies between the original event and the 
postevent material.
To clarify more precisely the mechanisms of the effects 
observed in Experiment I, we checked whether the subjects 
did remember the information presented in the original 
event. It is not impossible that high memory performance in 
the control groups where description was totally congruent 
with the recording was caused not by remembering the 
original event, but rather by recollecting information read 
in the postevent material. Such a mechanism could have 
influenced the memory performance in other groups as 
well. To verify how much of the original information could 
be remembered by the participants, we then conducted 
Experiment II, in which subjects did not receive any 
postevent description of the recording. 
Experiment II
Method
Participants
Sixty high-school students took part in this study (43 
females, 17 males). Mean age was 16.05 (SD = 0.29). As in 
the previous experiments, no gratification for participating 
in the experiment was given. 
  
Materials
In Experiment II, the same materials applied in 
Experiment I were used, except that no description of the 
recording was provided to the subjects.
Procedure
The procedure of the study was almost the same as in 
Experiment I, but no warning manipulation was applied. 
Subjects also did not read any texts on the recording. The 
only independent variable in Experiment I was high vs. low 
involvement. 
Results
To clarify whether reading the postevent description 
consistent with the original event positively influenced 
memory performance in Experiment I, the outcomes from 
relevant groups from Experiment I were compared with 
those from this experiment, and thus the procedure was rather 
a quasi-experiment. A two-way ANOVA was performed 
with two factors: presence vs. absence of the postevent 
text, and high vs. low involvement and performance on 
the critical items as the dependent variable. The only 
statistically significant effect was that of involvement – 
high involvement groups performed better (F[1, 154] = 35.46; 
p < .01; η2 < .19). The main effect of the presence/absence 
of the postevent text was non-significant (F[1, 154] = 2.74; p = 
.10; η2 < .02), nor was the interaction between involvement 
and the presence/absence of postevent text (F[1, 154] = 0.23; 
p = .63; η2 < .08). 
The same analysis was performed in the case of 
subjective confidence in memory accuracy, with the 
following results: higher confidence in the group in which 
the postevent information was presented (F[1, 154] = 17.51; p 
< .01; η2 = .10). As was observed in Experiment I, the main 
effect of high vs. low involvement was non-significant 
(F[1, 154] = 2.54; p = .11; η
2 < .02), as was the interaction 
of the involvement level and the presence/absence of the 
postevent information (F[1, 154] = 0.10; p = .75; η
2 < .01).
In summary, the results of Experiment II suggest 
that memory performance on the critical items was not 
influenced by the presence of the postevent information.
Discussion
The main purpose of Experiment II was to verify 
whether the results obtained by control subjects’ memory 
performance were affected by reading a text containing 
information consistent with the original event. Such a 
text might have refreshed the controls’ memory or even 
filled their memory gaps. To verify this, results of control 
subjects from Experiment I were compared to a new group 
of subjects, who did not read any postevent text at all. The 
difference between control groups was non-significant, 
nor was the interaction between the involvement and the 
“presence vs. absence of postevent text” factor. Thus, it 
follows that reading the consistent postevent information did 
not influence the memory of control subjects in Experiment 
I. Of course, inferring nonexistence from an insignificant 
effect is risky, but the statistical power in this analysis 
was quite high: with about 30 cases per cell the power to 
detect even a moderate effect size, e.g. eta-squared of .06, 
which corresponds to Cohen’s f of .25 and Pearson’s r of 
.25, “explaining” about 6% of variance was approximately 
90% Cohen (1988). The power to detect any bigger effect is 
of course even greater. Thus, it can be stated that there was 
a great probability of detecting any nontrivial effect. Since 
it was not detected, we can state that subjects reading and 
not reading the postevent text indeed do not differ in their 
memory performance.
This result is important, because if the consistent 
postevent narrative improved the memory of control 
subjects, the results of Experiment I would become 
uninterpretable and inconclusive. First of all, if reading 
the postevent material improved the memory of controls, 
the difference between controls and misled subjects could 
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no longer be unambiguously attributed to the effects of 
misinformation - the misled group might have performed 
worse not because the misinformation deteriorated its 
results, but rather because the postevent material improved 
the memory of controls. As this was not the case, the results 
concerning the misinformation effect seem to be valid.
In Experiment II, involvement influenced memory 
performance – highly involved persons performed better 
than those lowly involved, thus replicating the results from 
Experiment I. 
Confidence was higher in the case of subjects who 
received consistent subsequent information. This is 
intuitively understandable, as the text did not contain any 
discrepancies.
General discussion
In general, the results of our experiments suggest that 
personal involvement is an important factor, capable of 
impacting the memory’s functioning, and mediating or 
moderating the impact of various other variables on the 
mechanisms of the misinformation effect. First of all, high 
involvement alone improved memory functioning, thus 
confirming prior findings (e.g. Allport, 1943; Bellezza, 
1984; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Rogers et al. 1977). 
To be precise, in our research, involvement was defined 
and operationalized in the way suggested by Apsler and 
Sears (1968), that is, we assumed that high involvement 
occurs when the person believes that the matter at hand 
has consequences for his/her life. Such involvement seems 
to improve memory. This is intuitively understandable – 
from the perspective of adaptation paying more attention 
to a stimulus which might be important for one’s life 
functioning, engaging in its careful processing, encoding 
and keeping it in memory is understandable. The effect of 
involvement was statistically significant in Experiments I 
and II. 
Secondly, the highly involved and lowly involved 
groups differed as regards the effects of warning in the 
misled group – it reduced vulnerability to misinformation in 
the former but not in the latter. According to Christiaansen 
and Ochalek (1983), a necessary prerequisite for a warning 
to be effective is encoding of the original event – such 
an encoding might have been poor in the case of non-
involved subjects. Moreover, Polczyk (2007) stated that the 
warning is only effective when subjects are able to detect 
discrepancies between the original event and the postevent 
material, which means that subjects must not only encode and 
remember the original event, but also encode and remember 
the misinformation. If they do not see such discrepancies, 
warning can not reduce the misinformation effect, because 
subjects simply do not know what information from the 
postevent material they should beware of. For example, 
let us assume that according to the original event students 
could pass the final exam once a year, and according to the 
postevent material such an exam could be passed twice. If a 
subject is aware of this inconsistency, the warning provides 
immediate justification for it and the subject no longer has 
any reason to rely on the misinformation. If however a 
subject remembered the original information but did not 
notice the relevant misinformation, there would not be 
any misinformation effect at all and therefore the warning 
could not reduce it. Finally, if the subject did not notice 
the original information but noticed the misinformation, 
he/she can not be aware what is false in the postevent 
material and the efficacy of warning would be poor. In fact, 
in such a situation the warning can only be effective if the 
subject rejects all information from the postevent material. 
It appears then, that a warning would be most effective in 
the case of subjects remembering both the original and the 
postevent information. The number of such subjects might 
be lower in the group of non-involved subjects.
Non-misled participants performed worse, when they 
were warned, compared to non-misled non-warned ones. 
This is probably the most important result of the studies 
presented in this article and has obvious consequences for 
forensic psychology. On one hand, it is well accepted that 
instructing eyewitnesses that they should rely on their own 
memories only and reject information stemming from other 
sources is generally beneficial for the quality of testimonies 
(e.g. Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001). However, in the light 
of the results presented in this article, replicating those 
obtained by Echterhoff et al. (2007), it may be that in 
some circumstances such warnings may deteriorate the 
quality of eyewitness statements. If the person received 
correct postevent information about an incident to which 
he/she witnessed and was warned against any source of 
information different from the incident alone, he/she may 
reject this correct postevent information, and this may 
result in less correct testimony. 
To be precise, in our research the tainted truth effect 
was shown only in the case of high involvement. Contrary 
to our expectations, such an effect was not observed in the 
lowly involved groups. It is possible that the existence of 
the tainted truth effect among highly involved participants 
is caused by their engagement in the reading of the 
postevent information. Unlike lowly involved subjects, 
those highly involved might have wanted to get as much 
information about the issue the reform presented as original 
material allowed. Thus, they read the description carefully, 
which might have caused enlarged access to the postevent 
information – the basis for the overcorrecting process. 
A rather pessimistic conclusion follows: warning against 
(nonexistent perhaps) misinformation may be especially 
dangerous in the case of highly involved witnesses. In 
general, it appears that the warning against discrepancies 
between the original event and the postevent material should 
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have an extensive form. The witnesses should be told that 
they are asked to rely on their own memories only during 
interrogation, not on external sources like TV, Internet 
or other people, because these external sources may be 
wrong. However, the witnesses should also be told that if 
the information stemming from other sources is congruent 
with their own memories, they should not hesitate to use it 
during their testimony.  Of course, such a warning is more 
complicated and may even be difficult to understand for 
some witnesses. However, in light of the results presented in 
this paper, such a warning may minimize the risk of tainted 
truth – the risk of the negative influence of the warning on 
non-misled witness reports. 
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